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The Ulyukaev case – tension inside the Russian elite
Szymon Kardaś, Iwona Wiśniewska
Alexey Ulyukaev, the Minister for Economic Development, was detained on 14 November 
2016. Subsequently the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation launched an inves-
tigation against him on the charge of accepting a bribe (US$2 million). The bribe was report-
edly offered in appreciation of the ministry’s positive opinion that enabled the state-owned 
oil company Rosneft to take over a 50.08% stake in Bashneft (the transaction was finalised on 
12 October 2016). 
Much seems to indicate that the Ulyukaev case is an element of the rivalry of opposing groups 
of interest inside the Russian ruling elite. The operation was initiated by the CEO of Rosneft, 
Igor Sechin, and its goal was to deal a blow against the government’s economic bloc criticis-
ing Rosneft’s expansion in the Russian energy sector. In turn, the Ulyukaev trial itself has been 
used by Sechin’s numerous opponents to undermine his position. However, the developments 
seen over the past year show that Igor Sechin remains the key player in the Russian energy 
sector. He owes his position to his close links with Vladimir Putin and the important func-
tion which Rosneft plays in the country’s domestic and foreign policy. The conflict between 
interest groups is an integral element of the Russian political system, and allows the Russian 
president to play the role of arbiter in the government elite. The rules of operation of this 
system are unlikely to change significantly in the coming years. 
Combating corruption as an instrument 
of the political game in Russia
Accusations of corruption are a frequently used 
instrument of the political struggle in Russia. 
Numerous corruption scandals have been given 
a great deal of publicity in the Russian Federa-
tion over the past few years. Several governors 
(including Nikita Belykh and Aleksandr Kho-
roshavin) and state officials (for example, from 
the ministries of internal affairs and of defence) 
have been detained as a result of these scan-
dals. What makes the Ulyukaev case unique is 
the rank of the individuals engaged in it. This 
is the first time that an incumbent minister has 
been accused of corruption for reportedly ha-
ving demanded a bribe from the CEO of the 
country’s largest state-owned oil company (for 
details see Appendix 1).
The accusations against Ulyukaev were initially 
used by the Kremlin as a message to the Rus-
sian public that the government is engaged in 
an effective struggle against corruption and 
that everyone is equal before the law. Howe-
ver, this policy has been not entirely effective 
because the Russian public are convinced that 
corruption is widespread among state officials 
and that combating corruption is just a preten-
ce, one proof of which are the results of public 
opinion polls (only 36% of respondents viewed 
the detention of Ulyukaev as a manifestation of 
a real struggle against corruption, while over 
50% of them saw this as rivalry between various 
interest groups inside the elite). 
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Sechin versus the government’s 
economic bloc
It appears that the Ulyukaev case has been me-
rely a pretext used by Igor Sechin to demon-
strate his position in the elite and also to scare 
off his opponents and critics.  Sechin’s growing 
ambitions provoke not only resistance from 
interest groups but also criticism from the so-
called ‘economic bloc’ of the government. The 
members of this bloc, apart from Ulyukaev, are 
the deputy prime ministers Igor Shuvalov and 
Arkady Dvorkovich, and the Minister of Finance 
Anton Siluanov. It needs to be noted that the 
economic bloc which was in charge of prepa-
ring Rosnfet’s takeover of Bashneft and which 
in fact initially criticised this idea acted only as 
an advisory body in this process; the decision 
concerning this issue was taken at the Krem-
lin. The detention of the minister was doubtless 
also intended at undermining the position of 
Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev himself, who 
is believed to be one of the main opponents of 
Igor Sechin, and their mutual animosity is well-
-known. The Russian media suggest that Sechin 
might be the one who made the materials con-
cerning Medvedev available to the key Russian 
opposition activist, Alexey Navalny, which he 
used to prepare the film discrediting Prime Mi-
nister Medvedev titled He is not Dimon to you. 
The tasks of the economic bloc, which is respon-
sible for the country’s financial stability, have in 
many cases contradicted the interests of other 
members of the Russian elite, including Sechin 
and Rosneft, the company he manages. Gover-
nmental economists have on many occasions 
suggested that the efficiency of the Russian 
economy should be improved, for example, by 
restricting the state’s engagement in the econo-
my or introducing elements of competition to 
the economy. However, over the past few years, 
the role of the government’s economic bloc 
has been gradually weakening among the Rus-
sian  ruling elite; geopolitical interests and inter-
nal political benefits are much more important 
to the Kremlin than economic efficiency – one 
example of this is the annexation of Crimea. 
Sechin’s opponents in the Russian 
energy sector
Both the investigation and the manner in which 
the trial of Alexey Ulyukaev has been conducted 
show that he has received support from many 
sources, certainly not only from his friends but 
also from Sechin’s numerous opponents. This 
company’s excessively expansive policy in the 
Russian energy sector has triggered resistance 
from other entities in this sector. Although his 
opponents do not form a united front (and may 
also enter into tactical alliances with Rosneft 
on selected issues), they are most likely trying 
to use the trial to undermine Sechin’s position. 
These include both state-owned entities (above 
all Gazprom and Transneft) and private indivi-
duals and companies (including Gennady Tim-
chenko and Novatek, and LUKoil).
One of Rosneft’s main opponents is Gazprom, 
Russia’s largest state-controlled gas company 
which is part of the real system of power in 
Russia. Its non-transparent operations make it 
a source of income of the Russian elite. The 
company’s CEO is Alexey Miller. Gazprom’s at-
titude is a consequence of Rosneft’s growing 
ambitions in the gas sector. The dispute be-
tween the two companies concerns the strate-
gy of developing the gas sector, and the main 
issue in this dispute is currently liberalisation of 
gas export via  the pipeline system. At present, 
Gazprom has a legally guaranteed monopoly in 
this area. Igor Sechin has for many years been 
consistently lobbying not only for the liquida-
tion of the export monopoly but also for un-
The Ulyukaev case is merely a pretext for 
Igor Sechin to demonstrate his position in 
the elite.
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bundling Gazprom. Disputes over the imple-
mentation of specific projects are a constant 
element of relations between the two compa-
nies: Rosneft’s struggle for access to the trans-
port infrastructure on Sakhalin Island owned 
by the Sakhalin Energy consortium (Gazprom is 
a member of the consortium); the final decision 
concerning this issue – beneficial for Rosneft – 
was passed in September 2015; and the still un-
resolved dispute over gas supplies to Rosneft’s 
planned petrochemical plant in the Far East (no 
compromise has been reached with Gazprom 
as yet). At the same time, Rosneft and Gazprom 
are tactical allies as regards maintaining the 
existing rules of access to production at fields 
located on the Arctic Sea shelf. Pursuant to the 
laws currently in force, the right to obtain a li-
cence for exploration and production is vested 
only in these two state-owned companies. 
Nikolai Tokarev (a former KGB officer, he wor-
ked with Vladimir Putin in East Germany), the 
CEO of the state-owned company Transneft, 
the owner and operator of almost the entire 
network of Russia’s oil pipelines, has also been 
engaged in numerous disputes with Igor Sechin 
for years. The disputed issues include: the value 
of transport tariffs, the priorities of developing 
the transport infrastructure in Russia (Transneft 
is opposed to plans to build connectors to a lar-
ge petrochemical complex planned by Rosneft in 
the Russian Far East); Rosneft’s failure to comply 
with its obligations concerning volumes of sup-
ply to newly launched oil pipelines (for example, 
Kuyumba – Taishet); and media speculations over 
a possible takeover of Transneft by Rosneft. 
One of Igor Sechin’s rivals, among private en-
tities, for influence in the sector is Gennady 
Timchenko, a friend of Vladimir Putin and a co-
-owner of Novatek, Russia’s largest private gas 
producer. Until March 2014, Timchenko was one 
of the major shareholders of Gunvor, a trader 
firm which won a 40% share of Russian oil tra-
de in the 2000s (predominantly oil supplied by 
Rosneft). However, in 2013–2014, its share fell to 
1% mainly as a consequence of Rosneft’s discon-
tinuing using Gunvor’s trader services. In turn, 
Novatek is Rosneft’s competitor on the Russian 
gas market (they are mainly vying for lucrative 
contracts with industrial gas recipients). 
At the same time, Novatek is Rosneft’s impor-
tant ally in the efforts to lobby for restricting 
Gazprom’s export monopoly. One illustration 
of the joint lobbying efforts of Sechin and Tim-
chenko was the act on liberalisation of the ru-
les of liquefied natural gas export adopted in 
November 2013 which vested Novatek and Ro-
sneft with the right to export LNG (although 
the act introduced general criteria which need 
to be fulfilled in order to obtain export licences, 
in practice only Novatek and Rosneft meet the-
se criteria). Furthermore, Novatek and Rosneft 
oppose Gazprom’s proposals to increase the 
volume of gas sold on the Russian exchange (at 
present, Gazprom cannot sell more gas on the 
Russian exchange than all the other producers 
in aggregate; furthermore, the volume cannot 
exceed 17.5 billion m3 of gas annually).
Another of Sechin’s opponents is Vagit Alekpe-
rov, the head of LUKoil, Russia’s largest private 
oil producer. Rosneft is blocking private com-
panies’ efforts to be given the right to produce 
oil and gas in fields on the Russian Arctic Sea 
shelf. LUKoil is also concerned about media 
speculation that it might be taken over by Ro-
sneft. However, LUKoil is Rosneft’s tactical ally 
– although it is not engaged to the same de-
gree as Novatek – in lobbying for Gazprom’s 
export monopoly to be restricted. 
Even though no one has openly stood up in 
defence of the former minister Ulyukaev, the 
investigation and the trial have provided the 
opportunity to make attempts to discredit the 
reputation of Igor Sechin. Until recently Sechin 
Igor Sechin’s growing ambitions have met 
with resistance from interest groups and 
the governmental economic bloc.
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had shunned publicity but has become an im-
portant subject of a public trial during which 
aspects of the case are being revealed to the 
general public; many of these are inconvenient 
for both Sechin and the Russian secret servi-
ces which prepared the operation to detain 
Ulyukaev. The public disclosure of the FSB’s 
operational materials proved to be especial-
ly inconvenient. These included films showing 
the detention of Ulyukaev and stenographic 
records of his tapped telephone conversations 
and his meeting with Sechin at Rosneft’s office. 
Not only did they fail to incriminate the former 
minister beyond any doubt – they also revealed 
important information concerning Rosneft’s 
operation and investment strategy. Igor Sechin 
was outraged by the decision to publicise these 
materials and called it ‘idiocy’. Interestingly, the 
films shown in the courtroom were leaked to 
the media in unclear circumstances (they were 
published on 14 November 2017). The nume-
rous albeit unsuccessful attempts to summon 
Sechin himself as a witness can also be reco-
gnised to some degree as a success for Sechin’s 
opponents. It can be concluded from the cour-
se of the trial so far that the services have not 
collected irrefutable proof of criminal activity 
(or have not shared it) – in fact the trial can be 
summed up as ‘Sechin’s word against Ulyuka-
ev’s.’ Furthermore, Ulyukaev not only has ple-
aded not guilty but has also openly accused the 
Russian secret services and Igor Sechin of plot-
ting against him. 
Sechin is still on top
Under Vladimir Putin’s rule, Igor Sechin has 
become a key figure in the Russian ruling elite 
and has significant influence on strategic deci-
sions. On the one hand, Igor Sechin’s position is 
a consequence of his loyalty to Vladimir Putin, 
with whom his career has been closely linked 
since 1991; Igor Sechin has followed Putin like 
a ‘shadow’, at first at his secretariat at the offi-
ce of the mayor of Saint Petersburg, and then 
in Moscow at the presidential administration 
and in the government (for more details, see 
Appendix 2). On the other hand, Sechin is so-
metimes used by the president for ‘special ta-
sks’, especially to discipline those members of 
the elite who have earned fortunes on state 
property (for example, the Yukos case). 
The summary of events seen in the past year 
(since Ulyukaev’s detention) proves that Sechin 
still has a strong position in the Russian  system 
of power. Firstly, the legality of Rosneft’s pur-
chase of a controlling stake in Bashneft has not 
been questioned even though this deal was al-
legedly linked with the ‘bribe’ offered to Alexey 
Ulyukaev. 
Secondly, the process of privatising 19.5% of Ro-
sneft’s shares that had been planned for many 
years was finally conducted in accordance with 
Igor Sechin’s concept and, as it turned out, in 
a very non-transparent manner. Rosneft’s sha-
res were bought by what formally is an inter-
national consortium consisting of the trader 
firm Glencore and the Qatari Investment Fund; 
the unclear ownership structure of the parti-
cipants of the deal and the next stage of pri-
vatisation of the block of shares (it was anno-
unced in September that a 14.2% stake would 
be bought by CEEFC, a Chinese company with 
non-transparent connections and an unclear 
ownership structure), adds to the suspicion 
that the immediate beneficiaries of the tran-
saction may be individuals linked to the ma-
nagement of Rosneft or other members of the 
Russian political elite. 
Thirdly, in July 2017, Rosneft won the auction 
for the licence authorising the exploitation of 
Erginskoye, one of the last undeveloped large 
oil fields located in the Khanty-Mansi Autono-
mous Area (its resources amount to around 
Sechin’s opponents also form tactical 
alliances with him.
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400 million tonnes of oil). The companies that 
had previously been interested in obtaining the 
licence included LUKoil and GazpromNeft. 
Fourthly, much seems to indicate that Rosneft’s 
claims with regard to AFK Sistema (a private 
company established in the early 1990s; many 
people originating from the KGB have worked 
in its management; it owned Bashneft un-
til 2014) will be satisfied in accordance with 
Igor Sechin’s expectations. Rosneft has accu-
sed AFK Sistema and its subsidiary AO Sistema 
Invest of acting to the detriment of Bashneft. 
The total value of the claims is 170.6 billion 
roubles; the court has awarded so far in court 
proceedings that the claims of Rosneft and Ba-
shneft worth 136.3 billion roubles are reasona-
ble (the award of the court of the first instance 
has been contested by both parties to the pro-
ceedings). 
Fifthly, the dispute with the Chechen leader 
Ramzan Kadyrov over Rosneft’s assets located 
in the territory of this republic has been resolved 
in Igor Sechin’s favour so far. The compromise 
reached in April 2017 has allowed Rosneft to 
maintain a 51% stake in Grozneftegaz, the com-
pany in charge of oil production in Chechnya. 
Sixthly, it seems clear that another stage of 
the tax reform in the oil sector planned by the 
government will take into account Rosneft’s 
proposals to a significant extent. The tax bre-
aks for Samotlor (one of the largest oil fields 
owned by Rosneft) have been maintained. The 
consent to maintain the preferences system is 
a major concession from the ministry of finan-
ce which initially proposed introducing a sys-
tem liquidating any tax breaks as regards the 
mineral extraction tax (MET) vested in Russian 
oil firms. 
No changes in the system
The Ulyukaev case has paradoxically demonstra-
ted the stability of the Russian system of power, 
where vying for influence and thus for public 
resources between particular interest groups is 
a constant element, and Vladimir Putin remains 
the key decision-maker. 
On the one hand, the strengthening of Sechin’s 
position would not have been possible had his 
moves not been approved by the Russian presi-
dent. Thus Vladimir Putin in a way becomes the 
guarantor for the assets and influence which 
Sechin has in the Russian energy sector and the 
ruling elite. On the other hand, it is beneficial 
for Putin to keep members of the elite uncerta-
in about the boundaries of their expansion and 
support, which allows him to continue playing 
the role of an arbiter in this system. This is the 
reason why he has been delaying some strate-
gic decisions proposed by Rosneft, such as re-
stricting Gazprom’s export monopoly. This mi-
ght lead to upsetting the balance in the energy 
sector and weakening the position of Russia’s 
largest gas company which also performs many 
important functions in the country’s domestic 
and foreign policy. 
In principle, the rivalry between the members of 
the elite is taking place behind closed doors, so 
it is unclear what the decision-making process 
itself looks like. However, it can be assumed 
that Russia’s shrinking financial resources are 
escalating this rivalry and contributing to redu-
cing the number of the members of the Kremlin 
elite. One effect of this might be the publicity 
given to the Ulyukaev case. This is, however, 
an exception rather than a rule – the ‘opera-
tions’ of removing the president’s close aides 
from top government positions and thus depri-
ving them of control of essential financial flows 
have not caused a similar resonance so far. This 
has happened, amongst others, to: Vladimir 
Yakunin (in 2015, he was removed from the po-
sition of the president of the Russian Railways 
which he had held for 10 years) and Andrey 
Conflicts inside the elite are an integral 
element of the system of power in Russia.
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Belyaninov (in 2016, he ceased to be the pre-
sident of the Customs Service of the Russian 
Federation, a position he had held for 10 years). 
In both of these cases, the officials were dis-
missed on favourable conditions and they not 
only were not held accountable for their ac-
tions but also maintained part of their assets. 
Thus in practice, the top members of the 
Russian elite centred around the Kremlin, 
including Putin himself, treat the state’s assets 
as their own property (at present, the state’s 
share in the economy exceeds 70% of GDP). It is 
unlikely that any major changes will be made in 
the rules of how this system functions after the 
expected re-election of Vladimir Putin in the 
upcoming presidential election. 
APPENDIX 1
The circumstances of the detention of Alexey Ulyukaev and the course of the trial
The evidence incriminating the minister was provided to the Investigative Committee by the Federal 
Security Service (FSB). The FSB had been inquiring after the minister in connection with the report 
from the CEO of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, that the minister had demanded a bribe (this reportedly took 
place during the BRICS summit in Goa on 16 October 2016, i.e. four days after Rosneft took over 
Bashneft). The FSB staged a provocation in Rosneft’s office against Ulyukaev by handing him a suit-
case containing US$2 million. This suitcase was found in Ulyukaev’s car at the time of his detention. 
Ulyukaev has pleaded not guilty from the very beginning. He claims that he did not know that the 
suitcase he received from Sechin contained money; he was convinced that it contained wine which 
Sechin used to give as presents to his guests (he received a basket with sausages made from the wild 
animals hunted by Sechin; it was delivered in the CEO’s room). 
Alexey Ulyukaev was put under house arrest under a court verdict passed on 15 November 2016 and 
was dismissed by the president one day later. The public trial into his case began in summer 2017. 
However, the court did not grant consent for the trial to be broadcast, and journalists are only allo-
wed to listen to the court sessions and report on the progress of the proceedings on-line. 
Prosecution witnesses have given statements so far. Recorded tapped telephone conversations, films 
showing Ulyukaev’s meetings with Sechin and the money found in the car have also been presented. 
Statements in court have been given, amongst others, by the officials who took part in the process 
of the ‘privatisation’ of Bashneft and officers of the services engaged in detaining the minister, 
including an FSB general, Oleg Feoktistov (his statements were not disclosed to the general public), 
who at the time of Ulyukaev’s detention worked as the head of Rosneft’s security service (from 
20 September 2016; he resumed service at the FSB in March 2017 to retire at the age of 53 at the end 
of August). Sechin has also been summoned to testify as a witness but has failed to appear in court 
due to his numerous official obligations (he has given statements four times during the investiga-
tion). Defence witnesses, including defendant Alexey Ulyukaev, have also been heard by the court. 
At present, the parties are preparing their final statements.
The evidence presented by the prosecutors does not conclusively incriminate Ulyukaev. Neither the 
tapped conversations nor the film prove that Ulyukaev had demanded a bribe from Sechin and knew 
that the suitcases he received contained money (his fingerprints were found on the suitcase handle 
but not on the banknotes). 
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Igor Sechin and Rosneft – their position in Russia
Throughout his career, Igor Sechin (who studied Romance languages and worked as an interpreter 
for the Russian army in Mozambique and Angola in the 1980s) has been closely linked to Vladimir 
Putin since 1991. Sechin has followed Putin like a ‘shadow’: at first at his secretariat at the office of 
the mayor of Saint Petersburg, and then in Moscow he served as deputy head of the presidential 
administration in 2000–2008, he performed the function of deputy prime minister for the fuel and 
energy sector in 2008–2012 and since 2012 he has held the post of executive secretary of the presi-
dential Commission for the Strategic Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector and Environmental 
Security. Throughout this period, initiating a number of acquisitions, he has turned Rosneft from 
a state-owned company of minor significance (Igor Sechin was the head of its board of directors in 
2004–2011, and has served as its CEO since 2012) into a dominant entity in the Russian oil sector. 
This process was initiated with the nationalisation of Yukos, which was Russia’s largest oil company 
until 2003; a great part of its assets has been taken over by Rosneft. The takeover of TNK-BP in 2013 
made Rosneft one of the world’s largest individual oil producers.
The company is one of Russia’s largest taxpayers. Rosneft’s investments in poorly developed regions 
provide an alternative for the lack of other development impulses; one of the most recent examples 
is Rosneft’s official participation as a strategic investor in the Far East – the company is expected to 
invest around 500 billion roubles in the construction of a petrochemical complex that will be a key 
investment as part of the Territory of Advanced Development in Primorsky Krai (the TADs are a new 
version of special economic zones). It also needs to be noted that private companies linked to re-
presentatives of the Russian ruling elite (including the Rotenberg brothers and Gennady Timchenko) 
have in many cases been put in charge of implementing Rosneft’s investment projects. 
Rosneft is also an important instrument in the Kremlin’s foreign policy. Many of Rosneft’s foreign 
investments are intended not so much at generating economic gain for the company itself but rather 
at strengthening the political influence of the Russian state. Examples of this include the projects 
implemented by Rosneft in Latin America (Venezuela, Brazil and Cuba), Asia (Indonesia) and the 
Middle East (Iraqi Kurdistan).
APPENDIX 2
